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FOR “OUR” SECURITY:  
Who is an “American” and What is Protected by 
Enhanced Law Enforcement and  
Intelligence Powers? 
Natsu Taylor Saito1 
 
In January 2003, the United States Justice Department’s latest wish list 
was leaked to the press.  Entitled the “Domestic Security Enhancement Act 
of 2003,”2 but more commonly known as “PATRIOT II,” it would expand 
the already impressive list of powers given law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies by the USA PATRIOT Act,3 which Congress hurriedly 
enacted in the weeks following the September 11, 2001 attacks on the 
Pentagon and the World Trade Center.  Patriot II, if passed, would go even 
further than the PATRIOT Act in dramatically curtailing the civil liberties 
of U.S. citizens as well as immigrants and legitimizing measures long 
sought—and in the meantime illegally used—by law enforcement agencies 
to suppress political dissent.4 
A particularly striking provision of PATRIOT II would allow the 
government to “expatriate” U.S. citizens, i.e., strip us of our citizenship, for 
becoming members of, or providing material support to, a group that is 
deemed a “terrorist organization . . . engaged in hostilities against the 
United States.”5  The terms “material support” and “terrorist organization” 
are defined very broadly, and “hostilities” is left undefined.6  In light of the 
United States’ long history of race-based exclusion from citizenship, its 
denial of constitutional protections to large groups of people identified as 
“Other,” and its repression of movements for social change and racial 
justice in the name of “national security,” this proposal should be especially 
alarming to everyone concerned with civil and constitutional rights. 
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Since September 11, the Bush administration has convinced Congress to 
pass hundreds of new laws giving the executive branch dramatically 
expanded powers.7  The administration has unilaterally assumed the power 
to detain thousands of people, hold them indefinitely and incommunicado, 
deny them access to the courts, and interrogate them.8  We are told that all 
of these measures are necessary to protect us, the American people, and the 
most basic “American values” of freedom and democracy.9    
But who is an “American” for purposes of governmental protection and 
constitutional rights?  To understand just who and what are being protected 
by the “war on terror” today, we need to look at these measures in the 
context of the United States’ long history of conflating race, “foreignness,” 
and disfavored ideologies;10 its consistent use of law enforcement and 
intelligence powers to suppress movements perceived as political threats;11 
and its more general use of the criminal justice system to preserve the status 
quo.12  This is a large subject, of course, and this essay provides only a brief 
sketch of some of the issues that must be considered in developing such an 
analysis. 
A.  THIS “NATION OF IMMIGRANTS” 
Who is an American?  The federal government has justified most of the 
post-September 11 measures taken in the name of “national security” as 
necessary to protect the American people.  Yet many Americans are 
significantly less secure as a result of the constriction of otherwise 
applicable constitutional rights.  In order to understand who is actually 
being protected by these measures, it is necessary to look at how  
“American” has been defined historically.  This section begins with the 
frequently invoked image that this is a nation of immigrants, then contrasts 
that description with the actual treatment of immigrants and the historic role 
that race and national origin have played in defining who is an American, 
both literally in terms of citizenship, and more generally in terms of who is 
actually protected by the law. 
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The United States is commonly described as a “nation of immigrants,”13 a 
phrase that evokes images of the Statue of Liberty holding out her beacon of 
light as a symbol of freedom and opportunity to the “huddled masses” 
oppressed elsewhere in the world.14  In the aftermath of September 11, 
President George W. Bush invoked this image, attempting to explain away 
the attacks on the ground that “they” hate “us” because of our freedom and 
prosperity.15  Prosperity in this construction is conceived of as a natural 
outgrowth of a “free market” economy which, in turn, has been given the 
status of an essential human right.16  This beacon of light image is also used 
to explain increasingly restrictive immigration policies; according to this 
portrayal, everyone wants to come and partake of our freedoms, and we 
clearly cannot accommodate them all. 
In reality, however, the United States has been anything but hospitable to 
immigrants since September 11.  Noncitizens, both temporary visitors and 
permanent residents, have been subjected to a variety of harsh measures, 
including the expedition of thousands of deportations;17 the “disappearance” 
and detention of at least 1,200 people;18 interrogations in the form of 
“voluntary interviews” with officials from the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS),19 
now under the Department of Homeland Security;20 and the requirements of 
a cumbersome new National Security Entry Exit Registration System.21 
Most of these measures have targeted men from Middle Eastern or 
predominantly Muslim countries and appear to violate fundamental 
constitutional protections such as the right to due process and equal 
protection22 which, at least in theory, apply to all persons in the United 
States, not just citizens.23  However, the government’s actions are largely 
immune from constitutional challenge thanks to a long history of Supreme 
Court cases stating that the “political branches” of government, i.e., the 
executive and the legislature, have essentially unfettered power with respect 
to immigration.  Called the “plenary power doctrine,” this refusal to enforce 
otherwise applicable provisions of the Constitution in immigration matters 
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dates back to the Chinese Exclusion Cases24 of the 1880s and 1890s, and 
has been invoked since then to allow, among other things, exclusions 
without hearings, deportations on the basis of secret evidence, and 
indefinite imprisonment when those deemed deportable have no country to 
accept them.25  The measures targeting immigrants since September 11 have 
been particularly severe, but they are nonetheless quite consistent with the 
government’s exercise of its plenary power over immigrants since the first 
federal immigration laws were enacted in 1875.26 
What does it mean, therefore, to call the United States a “nation of 
immigrants”?  It is certainly not a call to the huddled masses, who have 
been effectively excluded by policies including national origin quotas and 
country caps, requirements of immediate family ties or employment, and 
evidence of economic support.27  It is accurate, however, insofar as it refers 
to the fact that most who call themselves Americans today descended from 
peoples who are not indigenous to this land.  In other words, this is a settler-
colonial state,28 and the “nation of immigrants” characterization is perhaps 
most accurately understood as a call for unity among the settler population, 
an opportunity to identify with the privileged “we” who claim a share of the 
disproportionate wealth controlled by the United States and to distance 
ourselves from the “they” who envy our well-being.29 
Calling the United States a nation of immigrants sanitizes its history by 
focusing on those who immigrated voluntarily, initially from northern and 
western Europe and later from other parts of the world.30  This 
characterization completely excludes American Indians as members of the 
polity and conveniently reinforces the notion that they are “extinct.”31  
Further, it renders invisible the genocidal practices which have 
accompanied the colonization of the continent since 1492,32 and justifies an 
occupation that even U.S. government lawyers have conceded is not, for the 
most part, based on anything resembling valid title to the land.33  Likewise, 
this characterization disregards or, more accurately, attempts to eradicate 
the history of African chattel slavery in this country,34 the forced annexation 
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of the northern half of Mexico,35 and the illegal overthrow and occupation 
of the Kingdom of Hawai’i,36 leaving us with the myth that this was an 
essentially uninhabited land made prosperous by the hard work of freedom-
seeking European settlers. 
The determinants of citizenship have both reflected and reinforced this 
myth.  Most American Indians only became U.S. citizens in 1924 when 
Congress, in an attempt to undermine native sovereignty, unilaterally 
imposed citizenship on them;37 the government continues to treat them as 
members of “domestic dependent” nations,38 sovereign only to the extent it 
is convenient to “larger” interests of the United States.39  African Americans 
were not U.S. citizens until the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 
1868.40  As Supreme Court Chief Justice Taney stated forthrightly in the 
Dred Scott case, until the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, persons of 
African descent, whether “free” or enslaved, were neither citizens nor even 
“persons” under the Constitution.41 
The Constitution as originally drafted did not specify who was to be 
considered a citizen, but it did direct Congress to “establish an uniform Rule 
of Naturalization.”42  The first Congress, meeting in 1790, complied by 
passing an act that limited naturalized citizenship to “free white persons.”43  
Although modified after the Civil War to include persons of African 
descent,44 the racial restriction on citizenship was not completely eliminated 
until 1952.45  Interpreting the law in 1923 to find a “high-caste Hindu” 
ineligible for naturalization, the Supreme Court summarized the initial 
understanding of who was to be an American: 
The words of familiar speech, which were used by the original 
framers of the law, were intended to include only the type of man 
whom they knew as white.  The immigration of the day was almost 
exclusively from the British Isles and Northwestern Europe, 
whence they and their forebears had come.  When they extended 
the privilege of American citizenship to “any alien being a free 
white person” it was these immigrants—bone of their bone and 
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flesh of their flesh—and their kind whom they must have had 
affirmatively in mind.46 
As a result of this initial construction of who was legally an “American” 
and the related racially restrictive immigration and naturalization policies, 
“foreignness” has become part of the racialized identity of Asian 
Americans, Latinos/as, and those of Middle Eastern descent.47  One of the 
more obvious results of this imputed foreignness was the World War II 
internment of approximately 120,000 Japanese Americans, two-thirds of 
whom were U.S. citizens.48  The U.S. military’s justification for indefinitely 
incarcerating all persons of Japanese ancestry on the west coast, regardless 
of U.S. citizenship, gender, or age, was that it could not distinguish the 
“loyal” from the “disloyal.”49  This rationale, upheld by the Supreme Court 
on the basis of “military necessity,”50 presumes that: (a) disloyalty is a 
crime for which one can be imprisoned with no semblance of due process; 
(b) certain groups can be presumed disloyal on the basis of race or national 
origin (i.e., persons of Japanese but not German or Italian descent); and (c) 
at least for those groups, “blood is thicker than water,” making citizenship 
irrelevant.51 
The perception that only Euro-derivative settlers are “real” Americans 
persists in many ways despite the elimination of racial restrictions on the 
acquisition of citizenship by birth or naturalization.  Asian Americans and 
Latinos/as are still commonly treated as “foreigners,” regardless of how 
long their families have lived in the United States.52 Arab Americans and 
South Asians have been subjected to a dramatic increase in hate crimes 
since September 1153 as they have been “raced”54 in popular consciousness 
as not only foreign but as having terrorist sympathies as well.55  Ironically, 
even those truly native to this land are perceived as foreign, as attested to by 
the tragic death of Kimberly Lowe, a twenty-one-year-old Creek woman 
killed in Oklahoma on September 18, 2001, by young white men in a 
pickup truck who yelled, “Go back to your own country!”56 
      For "Our" Security            29 
VOLUME 2 • ISSUE 1 • 2003 
While the examples are endless, the significance that race, ethnicity, and 
national origin still have today in the social and legal determination of who 
is a “real American” is illustrated by briefly comparing the cases of four 
people the government considers “terrorists” and, therefore, presumably 
affiliated with “them” rather than “us”: John Walker Lindh, Yaser Esam 
Hamdi, Abdullah al-Muhajir (also known as Jose Padilla), and Timothy 
McVeigh. 
Soon after September 11, the United States was engaged in an 
undeclared, if very real, war in Afghanistan, claiming that its ruling Taliban 
government was harboring Osama bin Laden and the al Qaeda network 
believed to be responsible for the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade 
Center.57  After a massive bombing campaign, the United States succeeded 
in replacing the Taliban with a more U.S.-friendly government.58  In the 
process, the U.S. military captured over 600 men and boys of several dozen 
nationalities and transported them to the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba, where most continue to be detained and interrogated.59 
Two of those captured turned out to be U.S. citizens, John Walker Lindh 
and Yaser Esam Hamdi.  Lindh was immediately taken to Alexandria, 
Virginia, and charged with conspiring to kill Americans.60  As White House 
spokesman Ari Fleischer said, “the great strength of America is he will now 
have his day in court.”61  And, in fact, he appeared in a civilian criminal 
court where, represented by counsel and supported by his family, he 
pleaded to reduced charges of supplying services to the Taliban and 
carrying an explosive during the commission of a felony; he subsequently 
received a twenty-year prison sentence.62 
Hamdi, on the other hand, was first taken to Guantanamo Bay where it 
was discovered that he was a U.S. citizen born in Louisiana.63  Rather than 
being transferred to a U.S. civilian court, he was sent to a naval brig in 
Norfolk, Virginia, where he has been held incommunicado for well over a 
year, labeled an “enemy combatant”64 by the government, and denied access 
to counsel and the courts.65 
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What distinguishes Hamdi from Lindh?  The only apparent difference in 
their cases is that Lindh is a Euroamerican while Hamdi is of Middle 
Eastern descent.  Tellingly, the media immediately began referring to Lindh 
as “the American Taliban,”66 a moniker that has never been applied to 
Hamdi. 
The contrast between the treatment of Timothy McVeigh and Abdullah 
al-Muhajir reflects a similar disparity.  McVeigh was convicted for the 1995 
bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City;67 a bombing 
that resulted in the deaths of at least 168 men, women, and children,68 and at 
the time was characterized as the most devastating terrorist act to have taken 
place on American soil.69  Although convicted and sentenced to death, there 
was never any question that McVeigh would be given a full trial in a 
civilian criminal court, complete with the protections of constitutional due 
process,70 and no one questioned whether McVeigh and his co-conspirator 
Terry Nichols,71 both white, were really Americans. 
Abdullah al-Muhajir, on the other hand, will never receive his vaunted 
“day in court” if the administration has its way.  Al-Muhajir, known as Jose 
Padilla prior to his conversion to Islam, is a U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican 
descent, born in Brooklyn.  He was arrested at Chicago’s O’Hare Airport, 
apparently because the government suspected him of involvement in, or at 
least knowledge of, a plan to bring a small radioactive device, a so-called 
“dirty bomb,” into the country.72  Shortly before his preliminary hearing on 
the charges, he was instead transferred to a military prison in South 
Carolina.73  Like Hamdi, al-Muhajir has been designated an “enemy 
combatant,” held incommunicado, and interrogated for well over a year.74  
In December 2002 the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York held that while the government has the power to hold unlawful 
enemy combatants who are U.S. citizens, al-Muhajir is entitled to confer 
with his lawyer concerning his petition for habeas corpus.75  The 
government, however, is appealing and has yet to allow al-Muhajir to meet 
with his lawyer.76  Only discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, or 
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religion accounts for the discrepancy between the treatments of McVeigh, 
who succeeded in killing hundreds of Americans, and al-Muhajir, against 
whom the government has made only unsubstantiated allegations of 
participation in an attempt to kill Americans. 
B.  “OUTSIDE AGITATORS”: DISSENT AS UN-AMERICAN 
Perceived racial and ethnic distinctions are clearly a significant factor in 
who is considered an American for purposes of social inclusion and legal 
protection.  As briefly outlined above, race was literally a prerequisite to 
citizenship in varying ways from the founding of the country until 1952,77 
and it still accounts for much of the disparity in the rights actually accorded 
those who now hold U.S. citizenship.78  But the measures taken in the name 
of “our security” are much more than reflections of or attempts to maintain 
racial hierarchy in America.  If the problem were simply that racial 
disparities exist in the enforcement of the law, it could be resolved by 
effective enforcement of the Constitution’s guarantees of equal protection.79  
If, as argued below, the state’s law enforcement and intelligence powers are 
being used to protect the status quo—which includes but is not limited to its 
racial hierarchy—rather than the people as a whole, then we must address 
much broader structural questions regarding whom the government 
represents and protects. 
This section will consider examples of the U.S. government’s long and 
consistent history of suppressing movements for social change.  Laying the 
groundwork for many of the measures currently used or sought in the “war 
on terror,” this history also focuses on how those who challenge economic, 
social or political structures are conflated with immigrants, labeled “un-
American,” and accused of being “seditious.”  As a result, the employment 
of surveillance, infiltration, and “counterintelligence” tactics—designed to 
combat subversion by foreign governments—now appears justified when 
used against U.S. citizens and residents exercising their constitutionally 
guaranteed rights. 
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The U.S. government’s attempts to portray the threat embodied by the 
Other as pervading American society has been facilitated by fact that the 
United States, as a settler-colonial state, has acquired its territory and 
amassed much of its wealth by exploiting those deemed Other within its 
claimed borders.  In addition, the effective portrayal of the United States as 
a nation of immigrants has made it easy to use perceived racial and ethnic 
distinctions to create an internal “us vs. them” mentality.  Taking advantage 
of this construction, one of the first lines of attack on those perceived as 
threats to the status quo has been to label them as “foreign,” either literally 
because they are immigrants or because they are characterized as 
representing foreign powers or ideologies. 
As early as 1798, the first Alien and Sedition Acts80 were passed on the 
Federalists’ claim that the Jeffersonians were agents of France attempting to 
bring the French Revolution’s “Reign of Terror” to the United States.81  
Only Republicans were prosecuted under the Acts and for clearly political 
reasons.  Thus, for example, Congressman Matthew Lyon was sentenced to 
four months in prison for describing President John Adams as “swallowed 
up in a continual grasp for power, in an unbounded thirst for ridiculous 
pomp, foolish adulation, and selfish avarice.”82 
The institution of slavery was, of course, an essential aspect of the initial 
American status quo, well protected by the Constitution,83 and those who 
spoke out against its cruelties and advocated abolition were frequently 
charged with sedition.  Using that rationale, in certain periods the 
Postmaster General refused to allow abolitionist literature to be sent through 
the U.S. mail, and despite the First Amendment’s explicit guarantee of the 
right of the people to petition the government for redress of grievances, the 
House of Representatives enacted a “gag rule” forbidding the discussion of 
slavery.84 
Union organizers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were 
labeled “communists” and “anarchists” and working class unrest was 
blamed on immigrants.  Thus, for example, the labor disputes which 
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accompanied the depression of 1873-1877, particularly the fiercely 
contested strikes of railroad workers and miners, were consistently depicted 
as the work of outside agitators.  William Preston, Jr., says, 
A narrow focus on the Irish in the Molly Maguires [who organized 
dramatic actions in the Pennsylvania coal mines], on the few union 
leaders of alien birth, and on the scattered radicals among foreign-
born strikers encouraged the idea broadcast by the New York 
Herald that “the railroad riots were instigated by men incapable of 
understanding our ideas and principles.”85 
During the 1880s and 1890s immigrants were frequently conflated with 
anarchists and “variously referred to as ‘the very scum and offal of Europe,’ 
‘venomous reptiles,’ . . . and ‘that class of heartless and revolutionary 
agitators’ who had come ‘to terrorize the community and to exalt the red 
flag of the commune above the stars and stripes.’”86 
Congress began regulating immigration in 1875, and in the 1880s and 
1890s passed a series of acts excluding Chinese workers.87 In 1903, 
legislation was enacted which excluded “alien anarchists,” individuals who 
believed in or advocated the overthrow of government by force, and anyone 
“who disbelieved in” organized government or was “affiliated with any 
organization entertaining and teaching such disbelief.”88  This was the first 
federal legislation to ban immigrants on the basis of their beliefs or 
associations.  Congress portrayed this legislation as a response to the 1901 
assassination of President McKinley by Leon Czolgosz, but Czolgosz was a 
U.S.-born citizen with only vague anarchist connections.89  As Robert Justin 
Goldstein notes, 
The anarchist laws were the first sedition laws in American history 
since 1798, and the first laws in American history to provide 
penalties for simply belonging to a group (what later became 
known as “guilt by association”).  They became the models for 
later legislation directed at other targets—for example, the criminal 
syndicalism laws passed by many states in 1917-20 to outlaw the 
Industrial Workers of the World [IWW] and again in 1947-54 to 
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outlaw the Communist Party [CP]; the 1917-18 Federal wartime 
Espionage and Sedition Acts, which virtually outlawed all 
criticism of the government and were used to harass the Socialist 
Party; the 1917, 1918, 1920, 1940, 1950, and 1952 immigration 
laws used to exclude and deport members of the IWW and CP; and 
the 1940  Smith Act, outlawing advocating or belonging to groups 
advocating overthrow of the government, for all citizens, even in 
peacetime.90 
In periods of war, people identified as Other by virtue of race, national 
origin, or political views have been deemed “un-American,” a term that in a 
variety of ways implies more about one’s “loyalty” than one’s nationality.  
During the brutal four-year campaign to “pacify” the Philippines after it was 
ceded to the United States by Spain in 1898, those who opposed the war 
were dismissed as “liars and traitors.”  General Arthur MacArthur had a 
lawyer on the Philippine Commission draft “Treason Laws,” which defined 
treason as “joining any secret political organization or even as ‘the 
advocacy of independence or separation of the islands from the United 
States by forcible or peaceful means.’”91 
During World War I, the Justice Department tried to convince President 
Woodrow Wilson to try civilians accused of interfering with the war effort 
before military courts martial.92  That effort failed, but Wilson did sign the 
Espionage Act, which made it a crime to “willfully utter, print, write, or 
publish any disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language” about the 
United States, and allowed the Post Office to exclude from the mails any 
material advocating “treason, insurrection or resistance to any law of the 
U.S.”93  The following year Congress passed the Sedition Act,94 prohibiting 
essentially all criticism of the war or the government.  As Goldstein reports, 
Altogether, over twenty-one hundred [persons] were indicted under 
the Espionage and Sedition laws, invariably for statements of 
opposition to the war rather than for any overt acts, and over one 
thousand persons were convicted.  Over one hundred persons were 
sentenced to jail terms of ten years or more.  Not a single person 
was ever convicted for actual spy activities.95 
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African Americans were particularly targeted in the hunt for subversives 
and draft evaders, due, apparently, to “the widespread suspicion among 
whites that . . . enemy agents were actively subverting the loyalties of 
African Americans, who were believed to be uniquely susceptible to those 
who would manipulate them for sinister purposes.”96 
During World War II, Japanese Americans were categorically labeled 
“potentially disloyal” despite the fact that both the FBI and military 
intelligence denied that the community posed a threat to national security 
and, in fact, found no instances of sabotage or espionage by Japanese 
Americans.97  The wholesale incarceration of those of Japanese descent—
both “alien and non-alien”98—was driven primarily by pressure from 
nativist groups like the Sons of the Golden West, who had long advocated 
the exclusion of Japanese Americans.99  The government was able to 
successfully invoke the wholly unsubstantiated claim of “military 
necessity” because the groundwork for viewing Asians as the “yellow peril” 
had been laid by decades of racist stereotyping and exclusionary laws.100 
The “Cold War” which followed World War II illustrated that the pursuit 
of those considered “disloyal” was not to be limited to periods of actual 
warfare, but extended indefinitely.  In 1947, President Truman issued 
Executive Order 9835, which authorized the Justice Department to seek out 
“infiltration of disloyal persons” within the U.S. government and to create a 
list of organizations that were “totalitarian, fascist, communist or subversive 
. . . or seeking to alter the government of the United States by unconsti-
tutional means.”101  By 1954, the Justice Department had listed hundreds of 
organizations—including groups such as the Chopin Cultural Center, the 
Committee for Negro Arts, the Committee for the Protection of the Bill of 
Rights, and the Nature Friends of America—and either actual membership 
in or “sympathetic association” with such organizations was considered 
evidence of disloyalty.102 
The Internal Security Act of 1950, also known as the McCarran Act, 
required all members of “Communist-front” organizations to register with 
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the federal government and adopted a proposal, not rescinded until 1968, to 
establish special “detention centers” for incarcerating those so registered, 
without trial, at any time the President chose to declare an “internal security 
emergency.”103  Between 1945 and 1957, the House Un-American 
Activities Committee (HUAC) subpoenaed thousands of Americans to 
hundreds of congressional hearings, requiring them to testify about their 
political associations and their knowledge of the activities of their friends, 
neighbors and co-workers. 104  Those who refused were jailed for contempt.  
“Communism,” like anarchism, became a catch-all term to label a vague 
“enemy” against whom an undeclared “war” could be fought and 
increasingly restrictive measures imposed on the U.S. population.105 
Between 1947 and 1952, the FBI placed hundreds of informants within 
social and labor organizations and conducted “security investigations” of 
approximately 6.6 million Americans.106  These procedures set the stage for 
a massive program aimed squarely at suppressing all movements for social 
change in the United States.  Between 1956 and 1971, the FBI conducted 
over 2,000 domestic “counterintelligence” operations, called 
COINTELPROs (a cryptonym deriving from COunter INTELligence 
PROgram), in what a Senate investigatory committee called “a secret war 
against those citizens it considers threats to the established order.”107  The 
Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities, generally known as the “Church Committee” after 
its chair, Senator Frank Church, produced a massive four-volume Final 
Report in 1976.108  The Church Committee Report documented thousands 
of illegal and unconstitutional operations conducted by the FBI, the Central 
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense 
Intelligence Agency, Army Intelligence, and numerous other federal 
agencies over several decades, operations explicitly designed to destroy 
political movements these agencies viewed as threats to the status quo.109  
In the Committee’s words, these were part of “a sophisticated vigilante 
operation aimed squarely at preventing the exercise of First Amendment 
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rights of speech and association, on the theory that preventing the growth of 
dangerous groups and the propagation of dangerous ideas would protect the 
national security and deter violence.”110 
Because the Church Committee’s investigation was both constricted in 
scope and abruptly terminated in mid-stream,111 there is much we do not 
know about COINTELPRO-type operations.  Nonetheless, between the 
Committee’s official report and thousands of documents obtained under the 
Freedom of Information Act, we know that virtually every organization in 
the country perceived by intelligence or law enforcement agencies as 
advocating social change in any manner was targeted.  These organizations 
included all communist or socialist groups; the “New Left” in general, 
which included anti-war activists, student organizations, environmentalists, 
feminists and gay rights advocates; all organizations composed primarily of 
people of color, from African American civil rights and church groups to 
the Black Panther Party, the American Indian Movement, the Chicano 
Brown Berets, and advocates of Puerto Rican independence; and “white 
hate” groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.112 
While numerous federal agencies engaged in similar programs, the FBI’s 
COINTELPRO operations are the most thoroughly documented, and thus 
are used here to illustrate the methods employed.113  The best-known—and 
least egregious—category of their operations involved the acquisition of 
information through illegal means, including mail interception, wiretaps, 
bugs, live “tails,” break-ins and burglaries, and the use of informants.114  
These means were employed not simply to obtain information, but were 
explicitly intended to induce “paranoia” in movements for social change.  
As then FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover stated, he wanted his targets to 
believe there was “an FBI agent behind every mailbox.”115  In other words, 
such tactics were used precisely because of the chilling effect they would 
have on speech and associational activities, not because they were yielding 
evidence of criminal activity. 
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To give just one example, after fifteen years of litigation the Socialist 
Workers Party (SWP) and its youth organization, the Young Socialist 
Alliance (YSA), won a lawsuit against the FBI for surveillance that began 
in 1936 and entailed 20,000 days of wiretaps, 12,000 days of listening 
“bugs,” 208 burglaries of offices and homes, and the employment of 
thousands of informants.116  According to the opinion of the District Court 
for the Southern District of New York, 
Presumably the principal purpose of an FBI informant in a 
domestic security investigation would be to gather information 
about planned or actual espionage, violence, terrorism or other 
illegal activities designed to subvert the governmental structure of 
the United States.  In the case of the SWP, however, there is no 
evidence that any FBI informant ever reported an instance of 
planned or actual espionage, violence, terrorism or efforts to 
subvert the governmental structure of the United States.117 
The government was not simply “spying” on these organizations.  The 
stated objective of FBI COINTELPROs was to “neutralize,” i.e., disrupt 
and destroy, the targeted group, and, to quote the Committee’s Final Report, 
“[t]he techniques were adopted wholesale from wartime counterintelligence, 
and ranged from the trivial . . . to the degrading . . . and the dangerous.”118  
Building on the programs of illegal surveillance, a second level of tactics 
employed was the dissemination of information known to be false.  One 
version, sometimes called “gray propaganda,” involved the use of 
“confidential sources” and “friendly” media outlets to leak derogatory 
information about individuals and publish unfavorable articles and 
fabricated “documentaries” about targeted groups.119  Another form, known 
as “black propaganda,” involved the fabrication of communications 
purporting to come from the targeted individuals or organizations.120 
A third level involved attempts to destroy organizations by creating 
internal dissension and by setting up groups to attack each other—either by 
using groups already in existence, or by creating new groups solely for this 
purpose.  As reported by the Church Committee, “approximately 28 
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[percent] of the Bureau’s COINTELPRO efforts were designed to weaken 
groups by setting members against each other, or to separate groups which 
might otherwise be allies, and convert them into mutual enemies.”121 
A fourth level of COINTELPRO operations involved the deliberate 
misuse of the criminal justice system.  Working with local police 
departments, the FBI had activists repeatedly arrested, not necessarily to 
obtain convictions, but “to simply harass, increase paranoia, tie up activists 
in a series of pre-arraignment incarcerations and preliminary courtroom 
procedures, and deplete their resources through the postings of numerous 
bail bonds (as well as the retention of attorneys).”122  As most of its 
surveillance and infiltration revealed that the targeted groups were engaging 
in entirely lawful activity, the FBI resorted to placing agents provocateurs 
in organizations to advocate violence or illegal activities.  When that failed, 
government agents used fabricated evidence or perjured testimony to frame 
activists for crimes they had not committed.123  Finally, when all other 
avenues of “neutralization” had failed, “law enforcement” agents resorted to 
participation in direct physical assaults and assassinations, most notoriously 
the 1969 murders of Chicago Black Panthers Fred Hampton and Mark 
Clark.124 
 In light of recent developments, it is particularly significant to note that 
by declaring groups advocating social change to be threats to the national 
security, the FBI and other governmental agencies were able to more readily 
use techniques developed for “enemy agents”—presumably not protected 
by the Constitution—against U.S. citizens and residents.  The result was 
“law enforcement” practices which violated U.S. law, constitutional 
mandates, and the fundamental human rights of persons under U.S. 
jurisdiction, not to quash criminal activity or terrorist threats, but to 
suppress those who challenged the status quo.  As the Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence Activities concluded, 
Many of the techniques used would be intolerable in a democratic 
society even if all of the targets had been involved in violent 
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activity, but COINTELPRO went far beyond that.  The 
unexpressed major premise of the programs was that a law 
enforcement agency has the duty to do whatever is necessary to 
combat perceived threats to the existing social and political 
order.125 
While the FBI stopped calling such operations “COINTELPROs” when the 
program was exposed in the early 1970s, there is ample evidence both that 
such operations have continued126 and that each successive administration 
has asked Congress for legislation which would “legalize” many of the 
methods described above.127 
C.  MAINTAINING SOCIAL CONTROL THROUGH “WAR ON CRIME” 
Part A briefly outlined the role race has played in the definition of who is 
an “American,” and Part B focused on how criticism of U.S. policies or 
association with disfavored organizations have been conflated with treason 
and sedition, turning those accused of such activities into the “enemy”—
disloyal, subversive, and un-American.  Both sections traced how law and 
law enforcement powers have been used to preserve the particular racial, 
economic, and political status quo that has been defined as American, 
setting the stage for much of what is happening today in the “war on terror.”  
To understand the weapons that are available to, or being sought by, the 
government in its current “war,” however, we need to consider not only the 
United States’ history of racial subordination and ideological repression, but 
also the powers that have been given to law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies in their sweeping “war on crime” and, in particular, in the “war on 
drugs.” 
During the 1960s, the United States faced massive challenges to the 
status quo, not only from organized social and political forces—such as the 
civil rights movement, the women’s movement, massive anti-war 
mobilizations, and the resurgence of organized labor128—but also from the 
hundreds of urban rebellions that rocked every major U.S. city.129  These 
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rebellions were particularly frightening to those in power because they were 
spontaneous and widespread and, as a result, were not susceptible to the 
“neutralization” tactics of COINTELPRO-type operations.130 
In 1967, following “riots” in Newark, Detroit, Cleveland, and nearly 150 
other cities,131 President Lyndon Johnson convened a National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders, commonly referred to as the Kerner 
Commission after its chair, Illinois Governor Otto Kerner.  The Kerner 
Commission was given the task of determining what had happened, why it 
happened, and what could be done to prevent it from happening again.132  
The Commission concluded that the primary cause of the rebellions was 
“pervasive discrimination and segregation in employment, education and 
housing” and the resulting “frustrations of powerlessness” which permeated 
the “ghettos.”133  The Commission made extensive recommendations for 
federal programs to improve employment, education, the welfare system, 
and housing in poor communities.134  The Commission viewed these 
improvements as the only viable long-term response to its most basic 
conclusion that “[o]ur nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one 
white—separate and unequal.”135  While noting that “[a]lmost invariably the 
incident that ignites disorder arises from police action,”136 the Commission 
did not conclude that more police or harsher laws were needed; rather, it 
recommended improved police-community relations.137 
Nonetheless, despite its stated awareness of the underlying causes of and 
solutions for “social disorder,” the government’s primary response since the 
late 1960s has been to wage an ever intensifying “war on crime.”138  As 
Richard Nixon said in campaigning for president, “doubling the conviction 
rate in this country would do more to cure crime in America than 
quadrupling the funds for Humphrey’s war on poverty.”139  In the war on 
crime, the people—at least those residing in poor communities of color—
quickly became the enemy, as illustrated by some San Francisco police 
officers’ reference to their community relations work in black 
neighborhoods as “Commie relations.”140  In Christian Parenti’s words, 
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“Crime meant urban, urban meant Black, and the war on crime meant a 
bulwark built against the increasingly political and vocal racial ‘other’ by 
the predominately white state.”141  Or, as H. R. Haldeman bluntly reported, 
“[President Nixon] emphasized that you have to face the fact that the whole 
problem is really the blacks.  The key is to devise a system that recognizes 
this while not appearing to.”142  A national survey taken in the summer of 
1968 found that over 80 percent of those polled believed that law and order 
had broken down and placed the blame on “communists” and “Negroes who 
start riots.”143 
Nixon had assumed office on a “law and order” platform and, perhaps 
because he soon discovered that there was little federal jurisdiction over 
most criminal activity, rapidly declared war on drugs.  Claiming a “tenfold 
increase” in the number of addict-users from 68,000 in 1969 to 559,000 in 
1971—an increase which “came not from any flood of new addicts reported 
to federal authorities in 1970 or 1971 but from a statistical reworking of the 
1969 data”144—Nixon announced to Congress in June 1971 that “[t]he 
problem has assumed the dimensions of a national emergency.”145   
In the meantime, the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act 
had weakened Miranda protections,146 authorized more telephone taps and 
bugs, and allowed police 48 hours of unwarranted wiretapping in 
“emergencies.”147  Further, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 had dramatically expanded the budgets of drug and law 
enforcement agencies.148  The 1970 Organized Crime Control Act, which 
contained the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)149 
Act, loosened the rules on admissible evidence, allowed seizures of the 
assets of any organization deemed a criminal conspiracy, created twenty-
five year sentences for “dangerous adult offenders,” and empowered secret 
“special grand juries” with broad subpoena authority. 
Nixon created a special Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement 
(ODALE), directly accountable to the White House, with the power to 
create “strike forces” using federal agents from the Bureau of Narcotics and 
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Dangerous Drugs, the Bureau of Customs, the Internal Revenue Service, 
and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.150  As ODALE engaged 
in a series of dramatic no-knock entrances into the houses of what turned 
out to be entirely innocent citizens, its director “explained that extraordinary 
procedures, to the limit of the law, were necessary because the nation was 
engaged in an all-out war against drugs and the very survival of the 
American people was at stake.”151  With massive federal subsidies available 
for weapons, training, prison construction, and automated information 
systems, many states followed the federal lead.152  The most striking 
example was in New York, where Governor Nelson Rockefeller 
implemented draconian drug laws with mandatory life sentences, even for 
sixteen year-olds, and requested that President Nixon and New York City 
Mayor John Lindsay set up “emergency camps” for detaining drug 
addicts.153 
Under the Reagan administration, the drug war’s focus on “foreign” 
enemies was intensified, with large-scale operations targeting Mexico and 
Colombia154 and an increased focus on immigrants as drug traffickers.155 
These operations set the stage for heightened military involvement, 
facilitated by amending the Posse Comitatus Act156 and welcomed as a way 
of maintaining military budgets in a time of apparent peace.157  Federal 
police powers continued to be strengthened, as the 1984 Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act158 allowed federal preventive detention, established 
mandatory minimum sentences, eliminated federal parole, scaled back the 
insanity defense, increased penalties for acts of terrorism, and greatly 
expanded asset forfeiture provisions.  The Bail Reform Act,159 also passed 
in 1984, expanded the use of preventive detention.  Despite Justice 
Marshall’s argument that “[s]uch statutes, consistent with the usages of 
tyranny and what bitter experience teaches us to call the police state, have 
long been thought incompatible with the fundamental human rights 
protected by the Constitution,” the Supreme Court upheld the practice in 
Salerno on the grounds that preventive detention is regulatory, not 
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punitive.160  While purportedly designed to keep “drug kingpins, violent 
offenders and other obvious threats to the community” incarcerated while 
awaiting trial, this act was immediately used to keep political resisters 
incarcerated, “provid[ing] the FBI with a weapon far superior to the strategy 
of pretext arrests” in detaining, among others, the Puerto Rican 
independentistas, Resistance Conspiracy defendants, and Irish Republican 
Army asylum seekers.161 
The 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act provided new mandatory minimum 
sentences without possibility of parole, including the requirement of a five-
year minimum for possession of either 500 grams of powdered cocaine or 
only 5 grams of crack cocaine; a particularly egregious disparity in light of 
the fact that powdered cocaine is used much more frequently by white 
Americans, while crack cocaine is used more by African Americans.162  
Furthermore, the 1988 Anti-Drug Abuse Act163 expanded the use of the 
federal death penalty and created a “drug czar” to coordinate between law 
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies.  The Act also allocated 
funds to the Department of Defense to train law enforcement officers, again 
expanded forfeiture laws, increased the severity of mandatory minimum 
sentences, and enacted “user accountability” provisions which provide for 
automatic eviction from public housing for tenants engaging in criminal 
activity on or near housing projects.164 
As these laws were being passed, huge sums of money allocated for 
police and prisons, and an increasing proportion of the population 
incarcerated, President Reagan was also dismantling the social programs 
which the Kerner Commission had identified as the only feasible alternative 
to urban rebellions.  According to Christian Parenti, “In 1982 alone Reagan 
cut the real value of welfare by 24 percent, slashed the budget for child 
nutrition by 34 percent, reduced funding for school milk programs by 78 
percent, urban development action grants by 35 percent, and educational 
block grants by 38 percent.”165  The 1988 Commission on the Cities 
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reported that poverty and racial disparities had, in fact, increased since the 
Kerner Commission’s report had been issued, concluding 
“Quiet riots” are taking place in America’s major cities: 
unemployment, poverty, social disorganization, segregation, 
family disintegration, housing and school deterioration, and crime.  
These “quiet riots” may not be as alarming or as noticeable to 
outsiders . . . but they are even more destructive of human life than 
the violent riots of twenty years ago.166 
Notwithstanding the emphasis given the war on drugs during the 1980s, 
national surveys indicated that, as of July 1989, only 20 percent of the 
American people considered drugs the most pressing national problem.167  
Nonetheless in September 1989 in his first televised speech as president, 
George Bush “declared a national consensus on the primacy of this issue—
‘All of us agree that the gravest domestic threat facing our nation today is 
drugs’—and then declared war, calling for ‘an assault on every front.’ 
Urging Americans to ‘face this evil as a nation united,’ Bush proclaimed 
that ‘victory over drugs is our cause, a just cause.’”168  Shortly after this 
speech, 64 percent of those polled had decided that it was, after all, the 
nation’s most pressing problem, and 62 percent were willing to sacrifice “a 
few of the freedoms we have in this country” to fight the war on drugs.169 
Who was the enemy in this war?  According to President Bush, it was 
“[e]veryone who uses drugs.  Everyone who sells drugs.  And everyone 
who looks the other way.”170  There is no evidence that these “wars” have 
reduced drug use or crime rates.171  Despite the public perception of 
increasing crime, the overall crime rate has remained stable since the early 
1970s.172  Nonetheless, in 1972 there were just under 200,000 people 
incarcerated in U.S. prisons; by 1985 there were 500,000; and by 1997 the 
number reached 1.2 million, plus another 500,000 in local jails.173  The 
United States now has one of the world’s highest per capita incarceration 
rates.174 
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Poor people and people of color have been disproportionately targeted in 
this war.  Although studies report virtually equal rates of drug usage among 
black and white Americans,175 in 1980 23 percent of all drug arrests were of 
African Americans, who comprise about 12 percent of the population, and 
by 1990 African Americans accounted for 40 percent of all drug arrests and 
over 60 percent of drug convictions.176  The incarceration rate of African 
Americans is now six times that of white Americans.  In addition, 80 
percent of all persons facing felony charges are indigent.177   According to 
Noam Chomsky,  
The so-called drug war . . . was aimed directly at the black 
population.  None of this has anything to do with drugs.  It has to 
do with controlling and criminalizing dangerous populations.  It’s 
kind of like a U.S. counterpart to “social cleansing.” . . . The more 
you can increase the fear of drugs and crime and welfare mothers 
and immigrants and aliens and poverty and all sorts of things, the 
more you control people.178 
 The use of the criminal justice system to control the poor and people of 
color is not new, but it appears to be intensifying.179  While many factors 
contribute to the spiraling incarceration rate, such as the soaring 
profitability of the prison-industrial complex and the political capital gained 
by appearing “tough on crime,” it is also a very effective mechanism for 
maintaining the economic and racial status quo.  This strategy is made more 
socially palatable by the portrayal of its primary targets as Other by virtue 
of race, and as the “enemy” by the declaration of war on crime and drugs.  
All of these deeply rooted trends—the portrayal of persons of color as not 
fully “American,” the labeling of social protest as seditious, and the 
dramatic expansion of the criminal justice system—have set the stage for 
the measures currently being taken in the “war on terror.” 
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D.  THE WAR ON TERROR: CONSOLIDATING EXECUTIVE POWER 
  The recently enacted USA PATRIOT Act significantly expands the 
options available to government agencies concerned with maintaining social 
control, especially when used in conjunction with the police powers 
provided by the legal developments discussed in the previous section.  With 
all of the powers obtained in the war on drugs firmly entrenched, the 1990s 
saw a gradual shift in emphasis from combating drugs to the “war on 
terrorism.”  In the process, Congress has consistently expanded the power 
of law enforcement an intelligence agencies to control the lives of those 
who are perceived as potential threats to the racial, economic, or political 
status quo.   
 While the PATRIOT Act and the proposed PATRIOT II have generated 
the most public scrutiny, these laws are simply the latest developments in 
“anti-terrorism” legislation which has been enacted over the past decade. 
The impetus for much of the legislation related to this new focus came from 
the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma City 
federal building in 1995.180  In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act,181 which fulfilled President Clinton’s 
election year promise to put an additional 100,000 police officers on the 
street.  It also provided more funds for state prisons, added a “three strikes” 
mandatory life sentence provision, enhanced sentences for “gang members,” 
directed the sentencing commission to increase penalties for offenses 
committed in newly designated “drug free zones,” made those convicted of 
such offenses ineligible for parole, and authorized the death penalty for 
numerous new categories of “terrorist activity.”182  The Act allocated an 
additional $25 million per year for the FBI’s “counterterrorism” budget and 
$25 million per year for training state and local SWAT teams.183 
Even though the FBI had reported only two incidents of international 
terrorism in the United States between 1985 and 1996, Congress passed the 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) whose 
“sweeping provisions served to license almost the full range of repressive 
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techniques which had been quietly continued after COINTELPRO was 
supposedly terminated.”184  AEDPA defines “national security” as 
encompassing the “national defense, foreign relations, or economic interests 
of the United States” and gives the Secretary of State broad authority to 
designate groups as “engaging in terrorist activity” if they threaten “the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the United 
States,”185 a provision similar to that authorized by President Truman’s 
1947 Executive Order.186   Under this Act, it is a felony to provide any form 
of material support to designated organizations, even if the support goes 
directly to an entirely lawful activity of the group,187 and noncitizens can be 
deported on the basis of secret evidence for belonging to organizations 
deemed “terrorist” without any showing of personal involvement in terrorist 
or criminal activity; in other words, for engaging in what would otherwise 
be associations protected by the First Amendment.188  As summarized by 
David Cole and James Dempsey, AEDPA 
resurrected guilt by association as a principle of criminal and 
immigration law.  It created a special court to use secret evidence 
to deport foreigners labeled as “terrorists.”  It made support for the 
peaceful humanitarian and political activities of selected foreign 
groups a crime.  And it repealed a short-lived law forbidding the 
FBI from investigating First Amendment activities, opening the 
door once again to politically focused FBI investigations.189 
At the same time AEDPA was passed, Congress enacted the Illegal 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), 
which not only made it easier to deport immigrants for their political 
associations but also for minor criminal convictions.190  Noncitizens, who 
were already excludable or deportable for serious criminal offenses and for 
virtually any drug offense, no matter how minor,191 became retroactively 
deportable for a wide range of minor crimes that were redefined as 
“aggravated felonies.”192  As a result, numerous long-time permanent 
residents have been deported for misdemeanor pleas or convictions several 
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decades old.193  Invoking the specter of terrorism, the Clinton administration 
was able to implement many laws that had long been on the executive 
branch’s “wish list.”  Thus, for instance, George Bush had twice proposed 
to allow secret evidence in deportation hearings,194 and both the Bush and 
Reagan administrations had tried unsuccessfully to criminalize “support” 
for terrorism.195 
With the September 11 attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade 
Center, the stage was set for swift passage of the next level of police and 
intelligence powers on the executive branch’s wish list,196 as Americans 
were informed once again that they would have to “sacrifice some liberties 
for their security.”197  With Attorney General John Ashcroft’s dire warning 
that the “blood of the victims” of the next terrorist attack would be on 
Congress’ hands if they didn’t act quickly,198 the USA PATRIOT Act199 
was rushed through the legislature and hurriedly signed into law.200 
The PATRIOT Act, a lengthy and complicated piece of legislation 
containing 158 separate provisions, dramatically expands the government’s 
law enforcement and intelligence gathering powers.201  Generally, the Act 
provides the government with enhanced surveillance powers, blurs the line 
between criminal and intelligence investigations, criminalizes political 
protest, and further curtails immigrants’ rights.202  While an in-depth 
analysis is not possible here, it is important to briefly highlight a few of its 
provisions that, in the name of protecting “our” security, significantly 
narrow the class of those protected by law. 
According to Nancy Chang of the Center for Constitutional Rights, in 
passing the PATRIOT Act, Congress “granted the [George W.] Bush 
administration its longstanding wish list of enhanced surveillance tools, 
coupled with the right to use these tools with only minimal judicial and 
congressional oversight.”203  The PATRIOT Act has also expanded the 
scope and duration of authorized surveillance and physical searches,204 
including authorization for “sneak-and-peak searches,” known in 
COINTELPRO days as “black bag jobs”, i.e. searches conducted without 
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notice of warrant until after the search has been completed.205  It is now 
easier for the government to obtain warrants for records from third parties 
such as telephone and utility companies, internet service providers, banks, 
credit card companies, and even public libraries.206  In addition to this 
expanded legal authorization for warrants, many companies report being 
pressured to “turn over customer records voluntarily, in the absence of 
either a court order or a subpoena, ‘with the idea that it is unpatriotic if the 
companies insist too much on legal subpoenas first.’”207    
As noted above, in COINTELPRO-type operations law enforcement 
agencies employed methods which were initially developed for use against 
foreign agents against U.S. citizens and organizations.  The PATRIOT Act 
attempts to legitimize this approach in a number of ways.  For example, 
Title II of the PATRIOT Act, “Enhanced Surveillance Procedures,” defines 
“foreign intelligence information” very broadly to include not only 
information relating to attacks or sabotage by foreign powers or their 
agents, but also “information, whether or not concerning a United States 
person [i.e., a U.S. citizen or permanent resident], with respect to a foreign 
power or foreign territory that relates to (i) the national defense or the 
security of the United States; or (ii) the conduct of the foreign affairs of the 
United States.”208  Under this definition, it appears that any person’s 
opinion on any aspect of U.S. foreign policy, no matter how theoretical or 
even inane, is “foreign intelligence information” and can now be disclosed 
“to any Federal law enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, 
national defense or national security official” to assist in the performance of 
his or her duties.209 
It has generally been presumed that the relaxed standards for warrants 
available under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA)210 were 
consitutionally acceptable because the purpose of the authorized 
surveillance was to obtain foreign intelligence information, not information 
intended for use in criminal prosecutions.211  Now, however, U.S. persons 
can be targeted on the basis—although not solely on the basis—of First 
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Amendment protected activities and subjected to extensive, and perhaps 
secret, surveillance and searches because they are involved in activities that, 
under the broader definition of “foreign intelligence information,” relate to 
U.S. foreign policy or national security.212  Court orders may now be 
obtained requiring the production of “any tangible things” upon certification 
that they are wanted for an investigation “to protect against international 
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities,”213 without the earlier 
requirement of “specific and articulable facts” for believing that the material 
sought pertains to a “foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”214  
Similarly, a provision of FISA that authorized warrants for wiretaps and 
physical searches without a showing of probable cause has been expanded 
to allow such searches where “foreign intelligence information” is “a 
significant purpose,” rather than “the purpose,” of an investigation.215 
As previously discussed, the United States’ history of penalizing 
organizations that appear “disloyal” is exemplified by the Justice 
Department’s creation, in the late 1940s, of a list of “subversive” 
organizations, and its practice of considering not only membership but 
“sympathetic association” with such groups as evidence of disloyalty.216  
Similarly, in 1996, under the authority of the AEDPA, the Secretary of State 
created a list of “foreign terrorist organizations” and made it a felony to 
provide material aid to these entities.217  Expanding on this precedent, the 
PATRIOT Act now authorizes the creation of a separate “terrorist exclusion 
list,”218 with increased penalties for providing material support to 
designated organizations.219 
Immigrants are now more vulnerable than ever, for the Act both broadens 
the definition of who is deportable and gives the government expanded 
power to indefinitely detain noncitizens.220 “Terrorist activity” is now a 
deportable offense,221 and recent amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act have expanded the definition of “terrorism” to include any 
crime involving a weapon or other dangerous device “other than for mere 
personal monetary gain.”222  In contrast, the State Department defines 
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terrorism as “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, 
usually intended to influence an audience.”223  The PATRIOT Act defines 
“engaging in terrorist activity” as encompassing solicitation of members or 
funds and providing material support or “encouragement” to a “terrorist” 
organization, even if the activity is undertaken solely to support the lawful, 
humanitarian activities of the organization, and even if the associational 
activities would otherwise be protected by the First Amendment. 224  These 
organizations need not be on any official list, but can simply be groups 
comprised of “two or more individuals, whether organized or not” engaging 
in certain activities, including the use or threat of violence.225 
If the attorney general certifies that he or she has “reasonable grounds to 
believe” that an immigrant is engaged in terrorist activities, as broadly 
defined above, or in other activities threatening to the national security, the 
PATRIOT Act provides expanded powers to indefinitely detain the 
noncitizen until deportation.  There is no requirement that the immigrant be 
given a hearing or shown the evidence on which the certification is based.226  
As Cole and Dempsey point out, the INS already had the authority to detain 
someone in deportation proceedings who presented a risk of flight or a 
threat to national security. “Thus, what the new legislation adds is the 
authority to detain aliens who do not pose a current danger or flight risk, 
and who are not removable because they are entitled to asylum or some 
other form of relief.”227 
The provision of the PATRIOT Act with the greatest potential for 
chilling the exercise of First Amendment rights and suppressing political 
dissent may be that which creates the new crime of “domestic terrorism.”  
Under the Act, “domestic terrorism” is broadly defined to encompass 
activities which are “dangerous to human life,” violate “the criminal laws of 
the United States or of any State,” and appear intended to “intimidate or 
coerce a civilian population,” “influence the policy of a government by 
intimidation or coercion,” or “affect the conduct of a government by mass 
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destruction, assassination, or kidnapping.”  They must also “occur primarily 
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”228  Any serious social 
protest, such as a demonstration against the World Trade Organization, the 
war in Iraq, or police brutality, is by definition intended to influence 
government policy and could easily be interpreted as involving 
“coercion.”229  Apparently, such protests now qualify as domestic terrorism 
if a law is broken and life is endangered, even by demonstrators who fail to 
obey a police officer’s order, block an intersection, or break a window.  Not 
only the protesters but also those who provide them with “material support” 
must now consider the fact that they could face felony charges and long 
prison terms.  According to Chang, because the crime of domestic terrorism 
“is couched in such vague and expansive terms, it is likely to be read by 
federal law enforcement agencies as licensing the investigation and 
surveillance of political activist[s] and organizations that protest 
government policies, and by prosecutors as licensing the criminalization of 
legitimate political dissent.”230 
As noted in the Introduction, in January 2003 a draft of the Justice 
Department’s “Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003” was leaked to 
the press.  Commonly known as “PATRIOT II,” this proposed legislation 
would significantly enhance the government’s already extensive powers 
under the PATRIOT Act.  A number of its provisions illustrate the Justice 
Department’s intensifying effort to characterize larger and larger sectors of 
the U.S. population as “the enemy” and to give itself virtually unlimited 
power to wage war on dissent.  
FISA allows many of the Fourth Amendment’s protections against 
unreasonable searches and seizures to be circumvented under the theory that 
the methods authorized are to be used against “foreign powers” who pose 
threats to the national security.231  The first section of PATRIOT II proposes 
amending FISA to extend the definition of “foreign powers” to a much 
broader swath of the American public.  “Agents of a foreign power” are 
currently defined as those who knowingly engage in intelligence gathering 
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activities on behalf of a foreign power if those activities “involve or may 
involve a violation” of federal criminal law.232  Section 101 of PATRIOT II 
would expand the definition of “foreign power” to include all persons who 
engage in “international terrorism” without any requirement of affiliation 
with an international organization.233  Section 102 would remove the 
requirement of a possible violation of criminal law.234  Under Section 103, 
the “wartime” authorization currently given the attorney general to engage 
in electronic surveillance or physical searches without prior FISA Court 
approval when Congress has declared war would extend to the periods 
immediately following a congressional authorization of the use of military 
force or an attack on the United States deemed to be a national 
emergency.235 
The crime of “domestic terrorism” created by the PATRIOT Act would 
be incorporated by Section 121 into the definition of “terrorist activities,” 
and would include related “preparatory, material support, and criminal 
activities.”236  The definition of “material support” for both “international 
terrorism” and “domestic terrorism” would also be expanded to cover 
“training,” which includes “instruction or teaching designed to impart a 
specific skill” and “providing personnel,” which includes providing an 
organization with “one or more individuals (including himself) to work in 
concert with it or under its direction or control.”237  In Section 121, the 
Justice Department proposes that all surveillance activities238 authorized in 
criminal investigations would be available in investigations of terrorist 
activities and in Section 123 explicitly removes domestic security 
investigations from the limitations on criminal investigations provided by 
the Fourth Amendment.239 
Private entities have traditionally been given greater latitude than the 
government to gather information about individuals on the theory that the 
Fourth Amendment applies to state action and the information is not 
obtained for the purpose of criminal prosecution.  Referring to this 
distinction as “perverse,”240 the Justice Department proposes in Section 126 
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to give the government “equal access” to consumer credit reports241 and in 
Section 129 to expand the financial and communications information it can 
obtain from private agencies using administrative subpoenas known as 
“national security letters.”242  Businesses and their personnel who 
“voluntarily” provide information to law enforcement agencies would be 
protected against civil liability by Section 313.243  At the same time that the 
government would be given more access to information about citizens, the 
proposed legislation would amend the Freedom of Information Act244 to 
allow the government to refuse to disclose information regarding detainees 
until it chooses to initiate criminal proceedings against them.245 
Despite the Church Committee’s exposure in 1976 of widespread illegal 
and unconstitutional conduct by federal law enforcement and intelligence 
agencies working closely with state and local police, no legislation was 
passed to limit such conduct, nor was any official punished for engaging in 
such practices.246  As a result, virtually the only constraint on such activity 
has come from court orders restraining police departments from 
investigating citizens without reasonable suspicion or probable cause to 
believe they have engaged in criminal conduct or may do so.247  Such court 
orders most often take the form of consent decrees, agreed to by the parties 
in settling civil suits challenging unconstitutional police practices.  Drawing 
explicitly on the Prison Litigation Reform Act, which terminated many 
consent decrees resulting from lawsuits brought over prison conditions,248  
Section 312 of PATRIOT II would prohibit, prospectively and retroactively, 
most consent decrees in police surveillance cases.249 
Furthermore, drawing explicitly on measures instituted in the “war on 
drugs,” Section 405 proposes to extend presumptive pretrial detention to 
persons accused of “offenses that are likely to be committed by terrorists”250 
and Section 408 would extend the government’s ability, already provided in 
the PATRIOT Act,251 to subject those convicted of terrorism-related 
offenses to “up to lifetime post-release supervision.”252  According to the 
Justice Department analysis, this extension of governmental power is 
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justified because “involvement by offenders in terrorism may be the result 
of persistent (or lifelong) ideological commitments that will not simply 
disappear within a few years of release.”253 
Also expanding on measures implemented in the “war on drugs,” 
PATRIOT II proposes eliminating the statute of limitations with respect to 
terrorism-related offenses,254 expanding the list of crimes subject to the 
death penalty,255 and denying federal benefits such as grants, contracts, 
loans, and professional or commercial licenses to those convicted of 
terrorism offenses.256 
Not surprisingly the proposed legislation would make it even easier to 
exclude, imprison, and deport noncitizens.  The 1996 IIRIRA redefined 
“aggravated felony” to include numerous misdemeanors and made 
immigrants retroactively deportable on the basis of prior pleas or 
convictions.257  Noting that this provision “perversely” makes immigrants 
subject to expedited deportation for offenses much less serious than crimes 
such as espionage, sabotage, draft evasion, violations of the Trading with 
the Enemy Act, or alien smuggling, Section 504 proposes to expand the list 
of offenses triggering the expedited removal provisions and to expand its 
applicability to all aliens, including permanent residents.258  Enhanced 
criminal penalties would be provided for violations of immigration laws,259 
and those persons who cannot currently be deported because of the 
conditions in their home countries may, at the attorney general’s discretion, 
“be removed to any country or region regardless of whether the country or 
region has a government, recognized by the United States or otherwise.”260 
The existing provisions of the PATRIOT Act coupled with the proposed 
“enhancements” of PATRIOT II dramatically expand the definition of 
“terrorism-related crimes,” making it much easier to prosecute people for 
political dissent, and impose extremely harsh penalties, including pretrial 
detention and up to lifetime post-release “supervision.”261  The effect is to 
eliminate a large and as-yet-undefined sector of “U.S. persons,” citizens and 
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permanent residents, from the “we” being protected by the measures 
allegedly being taken “for our security.” 
PATRIOT II goes even further, proposing to allow the government to 
literally make U.S. citizens into the Other by stripping them of their 
citizenship.  Under Section 501, the Immigration and Nationality Act would 
be amended to allow the expatriation of a citizen who joins, serves in, or 
provides material support to a terrorist organization “engaged in hostilities 
against the United States, its people, or its national security interests.” 
Given the broadly expanded definitions of “material support,” “terrorist 
organization,” and “national security interests” and the lack of definition of 
“hostilities,” this provision has virtually unlimited potential for rendering 
U.S. citizens stateless.262  Furthermore, in light of the United States’ history 
of disregarding international law263—as illustrated by the treatment of those 
held at Guantanamo Bay264—such persons could easily find themselves 
protected by no law at all. 
The “enemy” is again amorphous, the “war” pervasive, and the reach of 
constitutional protections even more circumscribed.265  More and more U.S. 
citizens and permanent residents have been, and can be, imprisoned for 
longer periods of time and for a wider range of “crimes” that increasingly 
include protected First Amendment rights to political beliefs or 
associational activity, on the basis of evidence obtained with virtually no 
Fourth Amendment restrictions.  U.S. citizens are now openly subjected to 
measures historically limited to “agents of foreign powers” and may soon 
literally be rendered “foreign.” 
E.  WHO—OR WHAT—IS PROTECTED BY EXPANDED LAW 
ENFORCEMENT AND INTELLIGENCE POWERS? 
Spurred by the Justice Department’s recent proposal to strip Americans 
of their citizenship on the basis of their political affiliations, as well as by 
the disparate treatment currently accorded both U.S. citizens and permanent 
residents in the name of combating terrorism, this essay has focused on the 
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question of just who is an “American” for purposes of examining and 
critiquing the measures being taken in the name of “our” security. 
Part A provided a brief overview of the role that race and national origin 
have played in determining citizenship because this history helps us identify 
the structural origins of the racial hierarchy which pervades our society and 
continues to influence the public perception of who is considered an 
American.  Part B presented some of the ways in which political ideology, 
not just ethnic identity, has been a determinant of who, or what, is protected 
by law, illustrating how those with “un-American” beliefs have been 
portrayed either as foreign or as agents of foreign powers and how the 
powers of the state have been used, legally or illegally, to suppress 
organizations and activities seen as threatening to the status quo.  Part C 
described how, by declaring crimes and drugs to be threats to national 
security, law enforcement agencies have been given dramatically expanded 
power, with the result that a huge portion of the population most likely to be 
dissatisfied with the status quo—the poor and people of color—has been, or 
is under the immediate threat of being, incarcerated.  Part D considered in 
summary fashion how these developments have come together in the 
current war on terrorism, which has targeted immigrants, people of color 
and those who dissent politically, focusing particularly on measures which 
will further reduce the legal and constitutional protections available to U.S. 
citizens, rendering them indistinguishable from “agents of foreign powers” 
in the eyes of the government.  
The Church Committee’s 1976 conclusion about COINTELPRO and 
related governmental operations is equally applicable to the more recent 
“wars” on crime, drugs and terrorism.  The Committee stated, “The 
unexpressed major premise . . . [is] that a law enforcement agency has the 
duty to do whatever is necessary to combat perceived threats to the existing 
social and political order.”266  As briefly outlined above, historically the 
United States’ criminal justice system and its intelligence agencies have 
been used to shore up the institution of slavery, crush labor movements, 
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protect explicitly colonial and imperialist ventures overseas, and undermine 
movements for social change, all in the name of protecting national security 
or American interests.  By creating widespread fear about the dangers 
inherent in anarchy, communism, drugs, crime, uncontrolled immigration, 
or terrorism, the government has convinced much of the U.S. population to 
cede more and more of our constitutionally guaranteed rights and to 
“sacrifice some freedoms for the sake of security.”  In the name of “law and 
order,” the state’s police power has been expanded to encompass nearly 
every aspect of everyday life,267 and the United States now incarcerates 
more of its people than almost any other country in the world.  In the name 
of preserving the “American values” of freedom and democracy, the U.S. 
government has condoned policies and practices that the Church Committee 
declared “abhorrent in a free society.”268 
In light of our history, I return to the question originally posed: who is 
being protected by these dramatically expanded law enforcement and 
intelligence powers?  It is not the poor, who comprise the bulk of those 
incarcerated.269  It is not communities of color, in which at least one-third of 
all young men are, or will be, imprisoned, on probation, or on parole.270  It 
is not immigrants, who have been interrogated, disappeared, detained, and 
deported by the thousands; or the victims of hate crimes perpetrated against 
those who appear to be “foreign.”  It is not those individuals who wish to 
struggle for civil rights, civil liberties, racial justice, or the sovereignty of 
indigenous peoples. It is not union organizers, environmental activists, 
advocates for gay and lesbian rights, or those who oppose U.S. military 
inverventions overseas or global economic institutions, who are made safer 
by such expanded law enforcement and intelligence powers. 
In this essay I have argued that the current expansion of governmental 
powers, like those described by the Church Committee, serves to protect the 
status quo, not the American people as a whole.  The presumption implicit 
in the call to support the measures being taken “for our security” is that the 
“average” (read “white”) middle-class American benefits from the 
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maintenance of the status quo.  But this assumption must be examined as 
well.  Americans have not been made vulnerable to terrorist attacks because 
of a lack of police power, but because American foreign policy continues to 
breed repression and resistance.  Despite the current Bush administration’s 
claim that terrorists attack symbols of American political, military, and 
economic power because “they hate our freedom,” there is widespread 
support throughout the world for the values of freedom, democracy and the 
rule of law that the United States is supposed to exemplify.271  United 
States’ foreign policy, which is all too often manifest in blatant disregard 
for international law and institutions, unilateral intervention, imposition of 
harsh economic policies, and support for repressive regimes, has generated 
much of the anger and frustration that results in terrorist actions.272  As long 
as such policies continue, the “average” American is not safe from attack, 
regardless of how many internal security measures are implemented.  
While Americans’ fears regarding their physical insecurity, dramatically 
heightened by the media coverage of the September 11 attacks on the 
Pentagon and World Trade Center, have been explicitly evoked to justify 
the “security” measures taken by the executive branch, a more subtle call 
for their support comes in the subtext—the call to protect “our way of life.”  
The government’s definition of national security now explicitly 
incorporates American economic interests, and most Americans are at least 
vaguely aware that the United States controls a hugely disproportionate 
share of the world’s wealth and resources.  In essence, the U.S. government 
is asking for unlimited power to bring the rest of the world “into line” with 
perceived U.S. interests and to suppress dissent at home in order to retain 
the economic benefits of its sole superpower status abroad and its settler 
colonial regime at home. 
Despite the mounting evidence that the “free market” policies being 
implemented throughout the world are not, in fact, raising the standard of 
living of the majority of peoples at home or abroad,273 and the fact that 
almost 40 percent of American wealth is controlled by the top 1 percent of 
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the population,274 it appears that the “average” American is comfortable 
with the belief, however ill-founded, that he or she is in a position of 
relative privilege and that it is somehow deserved.275  However, the real 
costs of sacrificing “some liberties”—both ours and others’—to maintain 
the apparent material benefits of the status quo must be considered. 
One of those costs is that the global policies being supported by the 
United States will continue to generate resistance both among less powerful 
countries and among groups who do not have the power of states and armies 
and, therefore, will see “terrorist” attacks as their only recourse. 
 More fundamental, perhaps, is the cost to all Americans of allowing a 
further erosion of the Constitution, the compact which creates the very 
legitimacy of this country and its government.  The history of the U.S. 
government’s use of repressive tactics and the attendant restriction of 
constitutional rights illustrates that such measures are not aberrational, used 
only in times of emergency with rights restored afterwards, but part of a 
steady ceding of power to the executive branch.  This power, in turn, has 
been used consistently to undermine not only the Constitution, but the rule 
of law more generally.  Regardless of how satisfied most Americans are 
with what they perceive to be the status quo, few would consciously trade 
away democracy to maintain it.  Yet this is what is happening.  
Democracy, at a minimum, requires a legitimate and representative 
government that complies with the rule of law.  Essential aspects of the rule 
of law—transparency, consistency, and due process—are being undermined 
by current domestic and international U.S. practices that are shrouded in 
secrecy, apply double standards, and circumvent due process.276  By failing 
to uphold the Constitution or to comply with international law,277 the United 
States government is actively undermining the rule of law, both at home and 
abroad.  Perhaps that 1 percent of the American people who control 40 
percent of the wealth, and those who benefit from the billions of taxpayer 
dollars being given to private prison corporations, or companies like 
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Halliburton to “reconstruct” Iraq, benefit from this status quo, but the rest of 
us do not. 
As the chief U.S. prosecutor for the Nuremberg Tribunal, Supreme Court 
Justice Robert H. Jackson stated, “We are able to do away with domestic 
tyranny and violence and aggression by those in power against the rights of 
their own people only when we make all men answerable to the law.”278  
Furthermore, the Nuremberg principles established that it is not only the 
right but the obligation of a people to ensure that their government complies 
with the rule of law.279  The rule of law is at stake now, as we watch long 
established principles of justice erode in the face of the “war on terror.”  
The government argues that the war on terror is being fought to preserve 
freedom and democracy, but the measures being taken are undermining 
those values much more effectively than any terrorist attack could.280   
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PARTY SUIT AGAINST GOVERNMENT SPYING (Margaret Jayko, ed. 1988). 
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117 Socialist Workers Party, 624 F. Supp. at 1380. 
118 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 3. 
119 Id.  
120 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 101, at 43–44; 
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 107 at 35–36. 
121 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 40. 
122 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF REPRESSION, supra note 101, at 44. 
123 For example, after spending twenty-seven and nineteen years, respectively, in prison 
for murders they did not commit, the convictions of former Black Panthers Geronimo ji 
Jaga (Pratt) and Dhoruba bin Wahad (Richard Moore) were overturned because of 
overwhelming evidence that the FBI had framed them using perjured testimony and 
falsified evidence.  See Wahad v. City of New York, 1999 WL 608772 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
(suit for damages); DHORUBA BIN WAHAD, MUMIA ABU-JAMAL & ASSATA SHAKUR, 
STILL BLACK, STILL STRONG; SURVIVORS OF THE U.S. WAR AGAINST BLACK 
REVOLUTIONARIES (1993); JACK OLSEN, LAST MAN STANDING: THE TRAGEDY AND 
TRIUMPH OF GERONIMO PRATT (2001); CHURCHILL AND VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF 
REPRESSION, supra note 101, at 77–94. 
124 See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F. 2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979); rev’d in part, 446 U.S. 754 
(1980), remanded 499 F. Supp. 640 (1980) (holding that gross negligence in the raids 
resulting in the deaths of Hampton and Clark was actionable); ROY WILKINS & RAMSEY 
CLARK, SEARCH AND DESTROY: A REPORT BY THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE 
BLACK PANTHERS AND THE POLICE (1973); Nikhil Pal Singh, The Black Panthers and 
the “Undeveloped Country” of the Left, in THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY RECONSIDERED 
(Charles E. Jones ed. 1998) 57, 79–80; CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF 
REPRESSION, supra note 101, at 64–77; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85, at xvi. 
125 SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT, supra note 107, at 3. 
126 See, eg., id. at 13–14 (noting operations which continued after Hoover’s official 
“termination” of COINTELPROs); see also CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, AGENTS OF 
REPRESSION, supra note 101, at 370–76 (noting operations in the 1980s against groups 
opposed to U.S. policy in Latin America and anti-war and anti-nuclear activists); Brian 
Glick, Preface: The Face of COINTELPRO in CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, 
COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 107, at xiv-xv (noting FBI operations directed at 
environmental activists and advocates of Puerto Rican independence); Bernard P. 
Haggerty, “Fruhmenschen”: German for COINTELPRO, 1 HOW. SCROLL, 36, 38 (1993) 
(detailing recent campaigns of harassment of black elected officials). 
127 Many of the attempts have been made in the name of fighting drugs, terrorism, or 
illegal immigration and are described in the following Parts C and D. 
128 See ZINN, supra note 103, at 435–528; GOLDSTEIN, supra note 85, at 429–545; 
CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS 
3–4, 33–35 (1999). 
129 See generally Report of the Nat’l Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (1968) 
(“Kerner Report”). 
130 See text accompanying notes 114-24 supra.  
131 See Kerner Report, supra note 129 at 32. 
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132 Id. at 1. The Commission was established pursuant to Exec. Order 11365, issued July 
29, 1967.  Id. at xvi. 
133 Id. at 10–11. 
134 For a summary, see id. at 23–29. 
135 Id. at 1. 
136 Id. at 206. 
137 See id. at 299–322. 
138 Lyndon Johnson announced to Congress in March 1965, “We must arrest and reverse 
the trend toward lawlessness. . .,”  despite the fact that his Crime Commission reported 
shortly thereafter that there was no significant increase in crime and that “[v]irtually 
every generation since the founding of the Nation . . . has felt itself threatened by the 
specter of rising crime and violence.”  ROBERT M. CIPES, THE CRIME WAR 3, 8 (1968). 
 A significant question we should be asking, but which is beyond the scope of this 
essay, is “a war on which crime?”  Leaving aside the even bigger question of which 
conduct is defined as criminal, we must note that in 1996 the National Institute of Justice 
estimated that the cost to society of  “violent” crime was about one tenth that of corporate 
crime, but we have seen no comparable war on white collar crime.  George Winslow, 
Capital Crimes: The Corporate Economy of Violence, in PRISON NATION: THE 
WAREHOUSING OF AMERICA’S POOR (Tara Herivel & Paul Wright, eds. 2003). 
139 See PARENTI, supra note 128 at 8. 
140 Id. at 26 (referencing “pow-wowing” with “hostiles”). 
141 Id. at 7. 
142 Id. at 12 (citing H. R. HALDEMAN, THE HALDEMAN DIARIES: INSIDE THE NIXON 
WHITE HOUSE 53 (1994)).  Nixon had already directly linked the “crime problem” to the 
civil disobedience tactics of the civil rights movement, saying, “the deterioration [of 
respect for law and order] can be traced directly to the spread of the corrosive doctrine 
that every citizen possesses an inherent right to decide for himself which laws to obey 
and when to disobey them.” Id. at 6 (citing Richard Nixon, If Mob Rule Takes Hold in the 
U.S.: A Warning From Richard Nixon, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Aug. 15, 1966). 
143 Id. at 7 (citing THE U.S. VERSUS CRIME IN THE STREETS (Thomas Cronin, et al. eds., 
(1981)). 
144 EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, AGENCY OF FEAR 174 (2d ed. Verso 1999).  As the 1972 
election approached, this was arbitrarily reduced to 150,000 addicts as evidence of 
success in the drug war.  Id. at 177.  Based on calculations of what addicts, presumed to 
be unemployed, would have to steal to support their habits, the Nixon administration also 
attributed $18 billion per year worth of crime to them, but in fact this was more than 25 
times the total unrecovered stolen property in the US in 1971. Id. at 178–79. 
145 Id. at 173. 
146 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment 
requires that persons be informed of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney 
in custodial interrogations). 
147 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 
197 (1968). 
148 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, tit. IX, 84 Stat. 922, 941–47 (1970). 
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149 The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was a chapter of the 
Federal Criminal Code created by Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 
(OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified as amended predominantly in 
scattered sections of 7, 15, 18, 49 U.S.C.).  While purportedly aimed at organized crime, 
these tools were immediately used against leftist organizations such as the Black Panther 
Party and the Puerto Rican independence activists.   
Congress enacted RICO over dissenters who objected to its scope extending 
beyond profit-motivated, organized crime.  During the enactment process, 
Congress made clear that RICO would extend to the politically, rather than 
economically, driven Black Panther Party, the KKK, and the Communist 
Party.  Moreover, Congress has rejected subsequent attempts to exclude 
political demonstrators from RICO’s purview.  
R. Stephen Stigall, Preventing Absurd Application of RICO: A Proposed Amendment to 
Congress’ Definition of “Racketeering Activity” in the Wake of National Organization 
for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 223, 243 (1995). 
150 See EVA BERTRAM ET AL., DRUG WAR POLITICS: THE PRICE OF DENIAL 107 (1996); 
see also Aryeh Y. Brown, In Memoriam: Ralph Seeley Obscured by Smoke: Medicinal 
Marijuana and the Need for Representation Reinforcement Review, 22 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 175, 220–21 (1998); Steven Wisotsky, Exposing the War on Cocaine: The Futility 
and Destructiveness of Prohibition, 1983 WIS. L. REV. 1305, 1415–16 (1983). 
151 See EPSTEIN, supra note 144, at 19.  According to Epstein, Nixon had hoped to use 
ODALE as a White House-controlled “counterintelligence” agency, but in the wake of 
Watergate, it and the BNDD were collapsed into a new agency, the DEA.  Id. at 252. 
152 These funds were distributed through the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration 
(LEAA), created by the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.  See Comment, 
Federal Interference with Checks and Balances in State Government: A Constitutional 
Limit on the Spending Power, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 402 (1979) (noting that by 1976, 20 
percent of most state budgets came from such federal funding).  
153 EPSTEIN, supra note 144, at 43. 
154 See John Barry, From Drug War to Dirty War: Plan Columbia and the U.S. Role in 
Human Rights Violations in Columbia, 12 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 172 
(2002); John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War;  The National 
Purse, The Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557, 574 
(1991); Joseph P. Shereda, The Internationalization of the War on Drugs and Its 
Potential for Successfully Addressing Drug Trafficking and Related Crimes in South 
Africa, 31 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 297, 304 (1997-98). 
155 See Victor C. Romero, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?: Undocu-
mented Immigrants’ Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 65 S.CAL. L. REV. 999, 1028 (1992).  
156 According to Kevin Fisher, prior to 1981, the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 made it a 
felony for any member of the Army or Air Force to assist in the enforcement of civilian 
criminal laws.  Partial repeal of the Posse Comitatus Act, insofar as it applied to civilian 
drug enforcement activities, was an early priority of the Reagan administration.  In 
response to administration proposals in this area, Congress amended the Posse Comitatus 
Act in 1981 to permit the use of military equipment and the extraterritorial use of military 
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personnel in civilian law enforcement.  Kevin Fisher, Trends in Extraterritorial Narcotics 
Control: Slamming the Stable Door After the Horse Has Bolted, 16 NYU J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 353, 391 (1984).  See also BERTRAM ET. AL., supra note 150, at 112. 
157 For an update on the heightened role of the military in the domestic “war on terror,” 
see generally Ann Scales & Laura Spitz, The Jurisprudence of the Military-Industrial 
Complex, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 541 (2003). 
158 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1989 (1984); see 
also PARENTI, supra note 128, at 50–51.  Nationally, gross receipts from seizures went 
from approximately $100 million in 1981 to over $1 billion in 1987.  Id. at 51. 
159 Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141–50, 3156 (1984). 
160 See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). 
161 COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 107 at il.  See also Laura Whitehorn, Preventive 
Detention, in CAGES OF STEEL 365–77 (Ward Churchill and J.J. Vander Wall, eds. 1992).  
The “Resistance Conspiracy” cases involved charges of seditious conspiracy against 
seven white activists protesting U.S. war crimes.  See id. 
162 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986).  See 
generally Jason A. Gillmer, United States v. Clary: Equal Protection and the Crack 
Statute, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 497 (1995); William Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio: 
Towards a Rational Cocaine Sentencing Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233 (1996). 
163 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988).   
164 See generally Christopher D. Sullivan, User-Accountability Provisions in the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988: Assaulting Civil Liberties in the War on Drugs, 40 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1223 (1989); Jim Moye, Can’t Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and 
Urban Development’s “One Strike” Eviction Policy Fails To Get Drugs Out of 
America’s Projects, 23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275 (2003). 
165 PARENTI, supra note 128, at 40–41. 
166QUIET RIOTS: RACE AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 181–82 (Fred R. Harris & 
Roger W. Wilkins, eds., 1988); see also James H. Johnson, Jr. & Walter C. Farrel, Jr., 
The Fire This Time: The Genesis of the Los Angeles Rebellion of 1992, 71 N.C. L. REV. 
1403 (1993). 
167 BERTRAM ET. AL., supra note 150, at 115. 
168 Id. at 114. 
169 Id. at 116. 
170 Id. at 114. 
171 PARENTI, supra note 128, at 59. 
172 According to the FBI’s Uniform Crime Rate (based on reported crimes), the rate per 
100,000 population was at about 6,000 in 1980, dropped somewhat in the mid-80s, and 
was again at about 6,000 in 1991.  The National Crime Survey (based on surveys to 
assess victimization, and generally assumed to be more accurate) reported a drop from 
nearly 12,000 in the early 1980s to about 9,000 in 1991.  See JEROME G. MILLER, 
SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 26–30 (1996). 
173 MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE 9 (1999).  See also JOEL DYER, THE 
PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: HOW AMERICA PROFITS FROM CRIME 1-2 (2000).  
According to a December 1999 report of the General Accounting Office, the number of 
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women in prison increased fivefold from 13,400 in 1980 to 84,400 in 1998, with 72 
percent of all women in federal prison serving time for drug offenses.  Nell Bernstein, 
Swept Away, in PRISON NATION, supra note 138, at 66, 67 
174 As of 1997, the U.S. was incarcerating one of every 155 Americans, second only to 
Russia among the 59 nations in Europe, Asia, and North America for which data are 
available.  MAUER, supra note 173, at 19–23. 
175 See David D. Cole, Formalism, Realism, and the War on Drugs, 35 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 241, 247–48 (2001); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus 
Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks,” 6 J. GENDER, RACE 
& JUST. 381, 395 (2002). 
176 PARENTI, supra note 128, at 57.  See generally Nunn, supra note 175. 
177 Stephen B. Bright, The Accused Get What the System Doesn’t Pay For, in PRISON 
NATION, supra note 138, at 6. 
178 See Noam Chomsky, Drug Policy as Social Control, in PRISON NATION, supra note 
138, at 57, 58.  See generally Graham Boyd, Collateral Damage in the War on Drugs, 47 
VILL. L. REV. 839 (2002). 
179 See generally JOHN K. ALEXANDER, RENDER THEM SUBMISSIVE: RESPONSES TO 
POVERTY IN PHILADELPHIA 1760-1800 (1980); CHARSHEE C.L. MCINTYRE, 
CRIMINALIZING A RACE: FREE BLACKS DURING SLAVERY (1993); NEIL WEBSDALE, 
POLICING THE POOR: FROM SLAVE PLANTATION TO PUBLIC HOUSING (2001); SCOTT 
CHRISTIANSON, WITH LIBERTY FOR SOME: 500 YEARS OF IMPRISONMENT IN AMERICA 
(1998). 
180 See Jennifer A. Beall, Are We Burning Only Witches? The Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996’s Answer to Terrorism, 73 IND. L.J. 693–95 (1998).   
181 Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 
1796 (1994) (amending the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, and 
also referred to as the 1994 Omnibus Crime Control Act). 
182 Parenti, supra note 128, at 63. 
183 CHURCHILL & VANDER WALL, COINTELPRO PAPERS, supra note 107, at 1 (citing 
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (1994)). 
184 Id. at li.  See also, David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: 
Civil Liberties Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 247 
(1996) (noting the dangers of the anti-terrorism bills subsequently enacted as AEDPA); 
Michael J. Whidden, Note, Unequal Justice: Arabs in America and United States 
Antiterrorism Legislation, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2825 (2001) (noting the discriminatory 
application of AEDPA). 
185 DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
SACRIFICING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE NAME OF NATIONAL SECURITY 119 (2d ed. 2002). 
186  See text accompanying note 101 supra. 
187 Cole & Dempsey, supra note 185, at 121–23. 
188 See William C. Banks & M.E. Bowman, Executive Authority for National Security 
Surveillance, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2000). 
189 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 2–3. 
190 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
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191 See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (rewriting exclusion 
and deportation grounds and adopting provisions to ensure removal of criminal aliens).  
See also ALEINIKOFF ET. AL., supra note 27, at 173, 425–30. 
192 See generally Dawn Marie Johnson, The AEDPA and the IIRIRA:  Treating Misde-
meanors as Felonies for Immigration Purposes, 27 J. LEGISL. 477 (2001). 
193 See COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 117–26.  See generally David Cole, 
Hanging With the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists, and the Right of Association, 
1999 SUP. CT. REV. 203 (1999); Kevin R. Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act, the 
Immigration Reform Act, and Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important 
Lessons for Citizens and Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY’S L.J. 833 (1997). 
194 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 109.  Despite the lack of Congressional 
authorization and several federal court decisions rejecting the practice, the INS had 
nonetheless been deporting people on the basis of secret evidence during this period.  See 
On the Use of Secret Evidence in Immigration Proceedings and H.R. 2121 Before the 
House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims, 106th Cong., at 
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/cole0210.htm (2002) (statement of Professor David Cole, 
Georgetown University Law Center) (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).  See generally Susan M. 
Akram, Scheherezade Meets Kafka: Two Dozen Sordid Tales of Ideological Exclusion, 
14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 51 (1999). 
195 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 108–09. 
196 See CHANG, supra note 8, at 48; see also Sharon H. Rackow, Comment, How the USA 
PATRIOT Act Will Permit Governmental Infringement Upon the Privacy of Americans in 
the Name of “Intelligence” Investigations, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1651 (2002) (noting that 
the new powers are unnecessary, violate civil liberties, and go beyond the stated goal of 
fighting terrorism). 
197 As in the war on drugs, apparently the public has once again agreed, with a 2002 
survey indicating that “49 percent of the public now thinks that the First Amendment 
‘goes too far,’ up from . . . 22 percent in 2000.”  Diane P. Wood, The Rule of Law in 
Times of Stress, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 455, n.1 (2003) (citing Richard Morin and Claudia 
Deane, The Ideas Industry, WASH. POST. Sept. 3, 2002, at A15). 
198 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 151.  Within weeks of the September 11 attacks, 
Attorney General Ashcroft had testified to Congress that the Justice Department’s 
mission had been redefined from focusing on criminal activity to detecting and halting 
terrorism, both in the United States and in other countries, and that its emphasis would 
forthwith be on prevention rather than prosecution.  John W. Whitehead & Steven H. 
Aden, Forfeiting “Enduring Freedom” for “Homeland Security”: A Constitutional 
Analysis of the USA Patriot Act and the Justice Department’s Anti-Terrorism Initiatives, 
51 AM. U. L. REV. 1081, 1086–87 (2002). 
199 USA PATRIOT Act.  
200 The history of the bill is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/bdquery/ 
z?d107:HR03162:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Dec. 3, 2003).   
201 See generally CHANG, supra note 8; Whitehead & Aden, supra note 198; Jennifer C. 
Evans, Comment, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA PATRIOT Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 933 (2002); Michael T. McCarthy, USA PATRIOT Act, 39 HARV. J. on LEGIS. 
435 (2002). 
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202 For a comprehensive consideration of the constitutional impact of the Act, see 
Whitehead & Aden, supra note 198. 
203 CHANG, supra note 8, at 48.  See generally Evans, supra note 201; Rackow, supra 
note 196. 
204 See, e.g., USA PATRIOT Act §§ 207, 216 (authorizing installation of pen registers 
and trap-and-trace devices when information sought is “relevant” to any criminal 
investigation); CHANG, supra note 8, at 49. 
205 USA PATRIOT Act § 213.  See also CHANG, supra note 8, at 51–52; Whitehead & 
Aden, supra note 198, at 1110–13.  After-the-fact notification may be delayed where it 
“may have an adverse result,” and in the cases of seizures if “reasonably necessary,” with 
the result that a person or organization subjected to a covert search or seizure may never 
be informed, or may learn about it only when the evidence obtained is used against them 
in court. 
206 See also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 198, at 1131–32; Mark Sommer, Big Brother 
at the Library: FBI’s Right to Data Raises Privacy Issue, BUFF. NEWS, Nov. 11, 2002, at 
A1.  See generally USA PATRIOT Act, tits. II–III. 
207 CHANG, supra note 8, at 49–50 (quoting Ohio State University law professor Peter 
Swire). 
208 USA PATRIOT Act § 203(a). 
209 Id. at § 203(a)(1). 
210 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, Pub. L. No. 95-115 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 
1801-62). 
211 Banks & Bowman, supra note 188, at 5–10, 90–92. 
212 On the USA PATRIOT Act’s expansion of FISA searches and seizures, see Whitehead 
& Aden, supra note 198, at 1103–07. 
213 USA PATRIOT Act § 215. 
214 50 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(2)(B) (prior to amendment). 
215 USA PATRIOT Act § 218.  On the dangers inherent in the removal of the “primary 
purpose” requirement, see Michael P. O’Connor & Celia Rumann, Going, Going, Gone: 
Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1234 (2003) 
(analyzing In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FOREIGN INT. SURV. CT. REV. (2002)), the 
only decision ever issued by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, 
confirming that the government can use FISA warrants to conduct surveillance for 
evidence it intends to use in criminal cases). 
216  See text accompanying notes 101-102 supra. 
217 The criteria for such designation are found at 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2003), 
and the list is published periodically in the Federal Register.  See, e.g., Designation of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 67 Fed. Reg. 14761 (Mar. 27, 2002). 
218 USA PATRIOT Act § 805.  See Designation of 39 “Terrorist Organizations” Under 
the “USA PATRIOT ACT,” 66 Fed. Reg. 63620 (Dec. 7, 2001).  The criteria for this list 
are much broader than for the list created under AEDPA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3) 
(B)(iv)(I)-(III) (2003). 
219 USA PATRIOT Act § 810(d). 
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220 See generally Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral 
Damage Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849 (2003) (noting the additional hardships 
imposed on Mexican immigrants by recent “anti-terrorism” legislation). 
221 USA PATRIOT Act § 411. 
222 Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii)(V)(b) (2003). 
223 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT, PATTERNS OF GLOBAL TERRORISM 2001, May 21, 2002, at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2001/html/10220.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2003), 
quoting 22 USC § 2656f(d). 
224 USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a).  See also Whitehead & Aden, supra note 198, at 1098–
99. 
225 USA PATRIOT Act § 411(a). The activities are listed at 8 U.S.C. § 
1182(a)(3)(B)(vi)(III) (2003). 
226 USA PATRIOT Act § 412 . 
227 COLE & DEMPSEY, supra note 185, at 156.  See also Regina Germain, Rushing to 
Judgment: The Unintended Consequences of the USA PATRIOT Act for Bona Fide 
Refugees, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 505 (2002) (noting the likely effect of the 2001 Act on 
political asylum adjudications). 
228 USA PATRIOT Act § 802(a). 
229 See Whitehead & Aden, supra note 198, at 1093 (“Conceivably, these extensions of 
the definition of ‘terrorist’ could bring within their sweep diverse domestic political 
groups, which have been accused of acts of intimidation or property damage such as Act 
Up, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA), Operation Rescue, and the 
Vieques demonstrators.”). 
230 See CHANG, supra note 8, at 44.  She goes on to note: 
Experience has taught us that when prosecutors are entrusted with the 
discretion to file trumped-up charges for minor crimes, politically motivated 
prosecutions and the exertion of undue pressure on activists who have been 
arrested to turn state’s witness against their associates, or to serve as 
confidential informants for the government, are not far behind.   
Id. at 113. 
231 See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 210.  
232 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A). 
233 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, supra note 2, § 101; analysis at 23.  
Section 107 also removes the distinction between U.S. persons and foreign persons with 
respect to the use of pen registers.   
234 Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003, supra note 2 §102; analysis at 23.  
235 Id. § 103; analysis at 23-24. 
236 Id. § 121. 
237 Id. § 402; analysis at 43. 
238 Id. § 121; analysis at 27. 
239 Id. §123; analysis at 28-30 (noting an explicit exception under “Katz and progeny” for 
activities directed at foreign powers, and that the Supreme Court stated in United States v. 
United States District Court (“Keith”), 407 U.S. 297 (1972), that “domestic security 
surveillance may involve different policy and practical considerations from the 
surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’”). 
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240 Id. § 126; analysis at 31. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. § 129; analysis at 33-35. 
243 Id. § 13; analysis at 41. 
244 Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1994))(commonly referred to as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)).  
See Wendy Goldberg, Recent Decisions, Freedom of Information Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. 
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